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11 Introduction
Multicriteria games were ﬁrst analyzed by Blackwell (1956). Here, contrary
to classical strategic form games, players face multiple objectives and the
payoﬀs according to the diﬀerent objectives of a player can not be compared.
The notion of equilibrium in non-cooperative games in strategic form is
introduced by Nash (1951). The set of Nash equilibria can be quite large, or
can contain outcomes that are not very suitable. To deal with this problem
various reﬁnements of Nash equilibria are given in literature. For example
Selten (1975) introduces the notion of perfect equilibria, i.e. equilibria that
are resistent against small mistakes in the actions of the players. Proper
equilibria are introduced by Myerson (1978). These equilibria are based on
the idea that players assure that costly mistakes occur with smaller prob-
ability than less costly mistakes. A survey can be found in Van Damme
(1987). Fiestras-Janeiro, Borm, and Van Megen (1998) study protective
and prudent behaviour in non-cooperative games. They prove that for ma-
trix games the set of protective equilibria coincides with the set of proper
equilibria.
Shapley (1959) introduces (Pareto) equilibria for two person multicrite-
ria games and shows the correspondence with Nash equilibria of so called
trade-oﬀ games. Since payoﬀs of diﬀerent criteria cannot be compared, the
set of equilibria can be quite large, but rather surprisingly, reﬁnements of
Pareto equilibria did not receive much attention in the literature. Borm,
Van Megen, and Tijs (1999) extend the notion of perfect equilibria to multi-
criteria games, prove existence and provide several characterizations. They
also hint at an extension of proper equilibria to a multicriteria setting.
In this paper we analyze three extensions of the notion of proper equilib-
ria based on diﬀerent types of domination. One of these extensions contains
the set of proper equilibria of trade-oﬀ games. The extensions are illustrated
by means of an example, clarifying the diﬀerences between the three types
of domination. Moreover, we study an extension of protective and prudent
behaviour to multicriteria games. We show that protective behaviour coin-
cides with prudent behaviour, and prove existence. Two examples illustrate
some special aspects of protective behaviour in a zero-sum like environment.
2 Preliminaries: multicriteria games
We consider mixed extensions of two person ﬁnite strategic multicriteria
games, in which player one can choose between m and player two be-
2tween n pure strategies. The sets {e1,...,em} and {f1,...fn} contain the
pure strategies of player one and two respectively. Player one and two
take into account r and s criteria respectively. Let A = (A1,...,Ar) and
B = (B1,...,Bs) be two vectors of real valued m × n matrices in which
the rows correspond to pure strategies e1,...,em and the columns to pure
strategies f1,...,fn. The matrix At (Bt) can be interpreted as the payoﬀ
matrix of player one (two) with respect to criterium t. A two person multi-
criteria game can then be described by a tuple Γ =  ∆m,∆n,u1,u2 . Here
∆m, a shorthand for ∆{e1,...,em}, denotes the set of all mixed strategies
of player one and ∆n (= ∆{f1,...,fn}) is the set of all mixed strategies of
player two. The (relative) interior of e.g. ∆m is denoted by ˚ ∆m: it repre-
sents the set of all completely mixed strategies. The functions u1 and u2 are
the (vector) payoﬀ functions of player one and two. For all (p,q) ∈ ∆m×∆n
u1(p,q) = (pA1q,...,pArq), u2(p,q) = (pB1q,...,pBsq),
or, in short notation,
u1(p,q) = pAq, u2(p,q) = pBq.
We will usually describe a two person multicriteria game by the tuple Γ =
 ∆m,∆n,A,B . The set of all r × s multicriteria games of this type is
denoted by MG(r × s,m × n).
The (Pareto) equilibria of multicriteria games can be described by the
notion of best reply functions. Take strategies p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆n. Then p
is a best reply to q (p ∈ B1(Γ,q)) if there is no strategy ¯ p ∈ ∆m such that
pAq < ¯ pAq (i.e. (pAq)t < (¯ pAq)t for all t ∈ {1,...r}). Similarly q is a best
reply to p (q ∈ B2(Γ,p))if there is no strategy ¯ q ∈ ∆n such that pBq < pB¯ q.
The strategy combination (p,q) is an equilibrium of Γ if p is a best reply
to q and q is a best reply to p. The set of all equilibria of Γ is denoted by
E(Γ). Note that we use the notion of strong dominance, which results in
weak (Pareto) equilibria.
There is a direct connection between multicriteria games and their corre-
sponding trade oﬀ games in which the various criteria of each player are
weighted.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  ∈ MG(r × s,m × n) be a two per-
son multicriteria game and let λ1 ∈ ∆r, λ2 ∈ ∆s be trade oﬀ (or weight)
vectors for player one and two respectively. Denote λ = (λ1,λ2). The
unicriterium game Γ(λ) is deﬁned as the bimatrix game with mixed strat-
egy spaces ∆m and ∆n and m × n payoﬀ matrices A(λ1), B(λ2) given by
3A(λ1)ij =
 r
t=1(λ1)t(At)ij and B(λ2)ij =
 s
t=1(λ2)t(Bt)ij. The set of all
Nash equilibria of the bimatrix game Γ(λ) is denoted by NE(Γ(λ)).
The following theorem states that each equilibrium of a multicriteria
game Γ can be found as a Nash equilibrium of an unicriterium game, derived
from Γ by using a suitable tradeoﬀ vector.
Theorem 2.1 (Shapley (1959)) Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicrite-
ria game. Then
E(Γ) = {(p,q) ∈ ∆m × ∆n | (p,q) ∈ NE(Γ(λ)) for some λ ∈ ∆r × ∆s)}.
Borm, Van Megen, and Tijs (1999) provide a characterization of (Pareto)
equilibria points in terms of carriers and eﬃcient best reply sets. Let (p,q) ∈
∆m ×∆n. The carrier of p with respect to Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  is deﬁned as
C(Γ,p) := {i ∈ {1,...,m} | pi > 0}. I ⊆ {1,...,m} is eﬃcient for player
one with respect to q in Γ if for all strategies p ∈ ∆m with C(Γ,p) ⊆ I
it holds that pAq is undominated in the polytope P1(Γ,q) := conv{eiAq |
i ∈ {1,...m}} ⊂ Rr of all possible payoﬀ vectors with respect to q. Note
that if I ⊆ {1,...,m} is eﬃcient, then each subset K ⊆ I is eﬃcient too.
I ⊆ {1,...,m} is an eﬃcient pure best reply set for player one with respect
to q in Γ if I is eﬃcient with respect to q in Γ and there does not exist an
eﬃcient set K ⊆ {1,...,m} such that I ⊆ K and I  = K. The set of all
eﬃcient pure best reply sets of player one with respect to q in Γ is denoted
by E1(Γ,q). In the same way one can deﬁne eﬃcient sets and eﬃcient pure
best reply sets for player two. The following theorem shows the connection
between best replies and eﬃcient pure best reply sets.
Theorem 2.2 (Borm et al. (1999)) Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a mul-
ticriteria game and (p,q) ∈ ∆m × ∆n. Then p ∈ B1(Γ,q) if and only if
C(Γ,p) ⊆ I for some I ∈ E1(Γ,q) and q ∈ B2(Γ,p) if and only if C(Γ,q) ⊆ J
for some J ∈ E2(Γ,p).
3 Proper equilibria
In this section we introduce three types of proper equilibria of multicriteria
games.
Borm et al. (1999) introduce perfect equilibria of multicriteria games, gen-
eralizing the notion of perfect Nash equilibria introduced by Selten (1975).
Take ε > 0. A strategy combination (p,q) ∈ ˚ ∆m × ˚ ∆n is called an ε-perfect
pair if there exists an I ∈ E1(Γ,q) and an J ∈ E2(Γ,p) such that pi ≤ ε, for
all i  ∈ I and qj ≤ ε for all j  ∈ J.
4Deﬁnition 3.1 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a two person multicriteria game.
A strategy combination (p,q) is a perfect equilibrium of Γ if there exists a
sequence {εt}∞
t=1 ⊂ (0,∞) converging to zero and a sequence {(pt,qt)}∞
t=1 ⊂
˚ ∆m × ˚ ∆n converging to (p,q), such that (pt,qt) is an εt-perfect pair for all
t.
Another reﬁnement of Nash equilibria are the proper equilibria, introduced
in Myerson (1978). Let Γ = (∆m,∆n,A,B) be an m×n bimatrix game, i.e.
Γ ∈ MG(1×1,m×n). Take ε ∈ (0,1). Then a strategy combination (p,q) ∈
˚ ∆m × ˚ ∆n is an ε-proper pair if for all i,k ∈ {1,...,m}, j,l ∈ {1,...,n} we
have:
eiAq < ekAq ⇒ pi ≤ εpk,
pBfj < pBfl ⇒ qj ≤ εql.
A strategy combination (p,q) ∈ ∆m × ∆n is a proper equilibrium of Γ if
there exist a sequence {εt}∞
t=1 of positive numbers converging to zero and a
sequence {(pt,qt)}∞
t=1 of completely mixed strategy combinations converging
to (p,q) such that (pt,qt) is an εt-proper pair for all t ∈ N. The set of all
proper equilibria of Γ is denoted by PR(Γ).
The idea behind proper equilibria is that costly mistakes occur with
relatively smaller probabilities than less costly mistakes, whereas in perfect
equilibria mistakes are not compared at all. Note that in unicriterium games
any two pure strategies can be mutually compared and as a consequence the
set of pure strategies can be partitioned into well-deﬁned levels of quality,
given a strategy of the opponent. In a multicriteria environment we do not
have this completeness and there are several options on how to deal with
this. We introduce three types of proper equilibria in multicriteria games
each based on another way of comparing pure strategies. To do so, we ﬁrst
introduce some terminology.
Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  ∈ MG(r ×s,m×n) and take q ∈ ∆n. The ﬁrst
level of best replies of player one against q is the set of all pure strategies
contained in some eﬃcient pure best reply sets with respect to q. The t’th
level of best replies is constructed by considering the best replies with respect
to q taking into account all strategies that are not in the ﬁrst t − 1 levels.




M1(q) := {1,...,m}, m1(q) := m
Γ1





1(q) := {i ∈ M1(q) | i ∈ I for some I ∈ E1
1(Γ,q)},





1 (q), mt(q) := |Mt(q)|
Γt





1(q) := {i ∈ Mt(q) | i ∈ I for some I ∈ Et
1(Γ,q)}.
Here ∆mt(q) = ∆({ei}i∈Mt(q)) is the restricted mixed strategy space and At
and Bt are the corresponding vectors of mt(q)×n submatrices of the vectors
of matrices A and B corresponding to the rows in Mt(q). Note that there
is an unique z ∈ N such that Mz−1(q)  = ∅ and Mz(q) = ∅. In the same way
one can deﬁne Nt(p), nt(p), Γt
2(p), Et
2(Γ,p) and Lt
2(p) for p ∈ ∆m.
Let ε ∈ (0,1) and Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. The com-
pletely mixed strategy combination (p,q) ∈ ˚ ∆m × ˚ ∆n is
• a pure domination ε-proper pair of Γ if for all i,k ∈ {1,...,m} such
that eiAq < ekAq it holds that pi ≤ εpk and if for all j,l ∈ {1,...,n}
such that pBfj < pBfl it holds that qj ≤ εql.
• a level domination ε-proper pair if for all i ∈ Lt
1(q): if there is a
¯ p ∈ ∆m and I ∈ Et−1
1 (Γ,q) with C(¯ p) ⊆ I such that eiAq ≤ ¯ pAq, then
pi ≤ εpk for all k ∈ I and if for all j ∈ Lt
2(p): if there is a ¯ q ∈ ∆n and
J ∈ Et−1
2 (Γ,p) with C(¯ q) ⊆ J such that pBfj ≤ pB¯ q, then qj ≤ εql for
all l ∈ J.
• a level ε-proper pair if for all i,k ∈ {1,...,m}: if i ∈ Lt
1(q) and
k ∈ Lt−1
1 (q), then pi ≤ εpk and if for all j,l ∈ {1,...,n}: if j ∈ Lt
2(p)
and l ∈ Lt−1
2 (p), then qj ≤ εql.
We now introduce three types of proper equilibria in multicriteria games.
The diﬀerence between the three types of proper equilibria are due to the
diﬀerent notions of domination between pure strategies used. The ﬁrst type
of proper equilibria is based on standard vector domination in all coordinates
(criteria), this leads to pure domination proper equilibria. In the second type
of domination a strategy ei dominates ek, if ei is contained in an eﬃcient
pure best reply set of a lower level such that there exist a mixed strategy
(with carrier within this pure best reply set) such that ek is dominated in
all coordinates by this mixed strategy. This second type of proper equilibria
is called level domination proper equilibria. Finally, in the third type of
domination a strategy of a higher level is dominated by all strategies of
lower levels. This leads to level proper equilibria. Note that in unicriterium
6games all three concepts of domination coincide. The idea of level proper
equilibria is shortly mentioned in Borm et al. (1999).
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. The strat-
egy combination (p,q) ∈ ∆m × ∆n is a pure domination proper equilib-
rium of Γ if (p,q) is a perfect equilibrium of Γ and there exists a sequence
{εt}∞
t=1 ⊂ (0,1) converging to zero and a sequence {(pt,qt)}∞
t=1 ⊂ ˚ ∆m × ˚ ∆n
converging to (p,q), such that (pt,qt) is a dominated εt-proper pair for all
t. Similarly the strategy combination (p,q) ∈ ∆m × ∆n is a level domina-
tion proper (level proper) equilibrium of Γ if (p,q) is a perfect equilibrium
of Γ and there exists a sequence {εt}∞
t=1 ⊂ (0,1) converging to zero and a
sequence {(pt,qt)}∞
t=1 ∈ ˚ ∆m × ˚ ∆n converging to (p,q), such that (pt,qt) is a
level domination (level proper) εt-proper pair for all t.
The set of pure domination proper equilibria of a multicriteria game Γ is
denoted by PDP(Γ). The sets of level domination proper equilibria and
level proper equilibria are denoted by LDP(Γ) and LP(Γ) respectively.
Proposition 3.1 Let Γ be a multicriteria game. Then LP(Γ) ⊆ LDP(Γ) ⊆
PDP(Γ).
Proof: It suﬃces to note that each level ε-proper pair is a level domination
ε-proper pair and each level domination ε-proper pair is a pure domination
ε-proper pair. ￿
In the following theorem it is shown that the set of pure domination
proper equilibria contains the set of proper equilibria of all trade-oﬀ games.
Theorem 3.1 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Then we
have that
{(p,q) ∈ ∆m × ∆n | ∃λ ∈ ∆r × ∆s : (p,q) ∈ PR(Γ(λ))} ⊆ PDP(Γ).
Proof: Let λ = (λ1,λ2) ∈ ∆r × ∆s and (p,q) ∈ PR(Γ(λ)). We ﬁrst show
that (p,q) ∈ PE(Γ). This follows immediately from Theorem 5.3 in Borm
et al. (1999) and the fact that in unicriterium games the set of proper
equilibria is contained in the set of perfect equilibria.
Furthermore, since (p,q) is a proper equilibrium in the unicriterium game
Γ(λ), there exist sequences {εt}∞
t=1 ⊂ (0,1) and {(pt,qt)}∞
t=1 ⊂ ˚ ∆m×˚ ∆n such
that limt→∞ εt = 0 and limk→∞(pt,qt) = (p,q) and (pt,qt) is εt-proper in
Γ(λ) for all t ∈ N. Let t ∈ N and let i,k ∈ {1,...,m} be such that
eiAqt < ekAqt.
7Clearly we are ﬁnished if we can show that pt
i ≤ εtpt
k.















Now the existence of pure domination proper equilibria easily follows
from the existence of proper equilibria in unicriterium games as proved in
Myerson (1978):
Corollary 3.1 For every multicriteria game, the set of pure domination
proper equilibria is non-empty1.
The following example illustrates the diﬀerences between the three concepts
of properness.
Example 3.1 Consider a (2 × 1,5 × 4) multicriteria game Γ with payoﬀ
matrix A and B given by
A =

   

(2,3) (2,3) (2,3) (2,3)
(0,3) (0,3) (0,3) (0,3)
(6,0) (6,0) (6,0) (6,0)
(3,2) (3,2) (3,2) (3,2)
(2,1) (2,1) (2,1) (2,1)










1 1 1 1
2 0 1 1
1 1 0 1
0 2 2 0






1We conjecture that the sets of level domination proper and level proper equilibria are
non-empty as well.
8respectively. Note that the vector payoﬀ of player one is independent of the
strategy chosen by player two. The set of possible payoﬀ vectors of player
one, conv{eiAq | i ∈ {1,...,5}}, does not depend on q and is drawn in ﬁgure
1. From this ﬁgure it is immediately clear that for all q ∈ ∆4 the set of ﬁrst
level eﬃcient pure best reply sets is given by E1
1(Γ,q) = {{1,2},{1,3}},
second, that E2
1(Γ,q) = {{4}} and E3
1(Γ,q) = {{5}}. It can easily be veriﬁed
that the set of perfect equilibria equals the set of Nash equilibria:
E(Γ) = conv{e1,e3} × conv{f1,f2,f4} ∪
conv{e1,e2} × {f1} ∪
{e1} × conv{f1,f2,f3,f4}
= PE(Γ).
To ﬁnd all pure domination proper equilibria, note that the strategy e5 of
player one is purely dominated by e4. Let ε > 0 and (p,q) a pure domi-
nation ε-proper pair. Then it holds that f4 is dominated by at least one
strategy: pBf1 > pBf4 or pBf2 > pBf4, (or both), from which it follows
that for a pure domination proper equilibrium (p,q) it holds that q4 = 0. By
choosing suitable sequences, one can show that all remaining equilibria are
pure domination proper. Therefore the set of all pure domination proper
equilibria equals
PDP(Γ) = conv{e1,e3} × conv{f1,f2} ∪
conv{e1,e2} × {f1} ∪
{e1} × conv{f1,f2,f3}.
To ﬁnd all level domination proper equilibria, note that for all q ∈ ∆4,
e4 is dominated by ¯ p = 7
10e1+ 3
10e3 and the carrier of ¯ p equals {1,3}. Hence
if (p,q) is a level domination ε-proper pair, then it holds that p5 ≤ εp4,
p4 ≤ εp1, p4 ≤ εp3. It follows that pBf3 ≤ pBf1 for small ε. If p2 = p4,
both f1 and f2 are best replies. The set of level domination proper equilibria
becomes
LDP(Γ) = conv{e1,e3} × conv{f1,f2} ∪
conv{e1,e2} × {f1} ∪
{e1} × conv{f1,f2}.
Suppose (p,q) is a level ε-proper pair. Then the following inequalities are
true p5 ≤ εp4 and p4 ≤ εpk, with k ∈ {1,2,3}. Consequently pBf2 < pBf1,
9pBf3 < pBf1, pBf4 < pBf1 and the set of level proper equilibria is given
by
LP(Γ) = conv{e1,e3} × {f1} ∪ conv{e1,e2} × {f1}.









Figure 1: Possible payoﬀ vectors of player one (independent of player 2’s
strategy choice).
4 Protective behaviour
Protective and prudent strategies for mixed extensions of ﬁnite games are
introduced in Fiestras-Janeiro, Borm, and Van Megen (1998). Generally
speaking a protective strategy of a player maximizes his worst possible payoﬀ
with respect to all pure strategy combinations of the other players. In case
of inconclusiveness it also searches for minimality in terms of inclusion of the
sets of pure strategy combinations which give rise to this worst payoﬀ. A
prudent strategy also maximizes the worst possible payoﬀ with respect to all
pure strategy combinations of the other players, but on the secondary level
it aims to minimize the cardinality of the sets of pure strategy combinations
causing this worst payoﬀ.
Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (1998) show that the notions of prudent and
protective are in fact equivalent and prove existence. Moreover, it turns out
that for matrix games the set of protective strategy combinations coincides
with the set of proper equilibria.
In this section we introduce protective and prudent strategies for our set-
ting of (two-person) multicriteria games. The equivalence of protective and
prudent strategies is shown and existence is proved. By means of an example
10we show that even for zero-sum like games protective strategy combinations
need not be Pareto equilibria.
Let θ : Ru → Ru be the map that assigns to any z ∈ Ru the vector θ(z)
which orders the coordinates of z in a weakly increasing order.
Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Let ¯ p ∈ ∆m. The pure
strategies of player 2 are compared on the basis of a worst case scenario
taking all criteria into account with equal importance. Hence the payoﬀs
corresponding to the several criteria are ordered in a weakly increasing order
and then compared by using the lexicographic ordering ( L). Recursively,
we deﬁne the vector at(¯ p) ∈ Rr and the sets Zt(¯ p) and Jt(¯ p) by
(i) for t = 1,
Z1(¯ p) = {z ∈ Rr | there is a k ∈ {1,...,n} such that ¯ pAfk = z
and such that θ(¯ pAfk)  L θ(¯ pAfj) for all j ∈ {1,...,n}}
a1(¯ p) = 2 θ(z) for all z ∈ Z1(¯ p), and
J1(¯ p) = {j ∈ {1,...,n} | ¯ pAfj ∈ Z1(¯ p)}.
(ii) for t > 1,
Zt(¯ p) = {z ∈ Rr | there is a k ∈ {1,...,n}\ ∪t−1
l=1 Jl(¯ p) such that
¯ pAfk = z and such that θ(¯ pAfk)  L θ(¯ pAfj) for all
j ∈ {1,...,n}\ ∪t−1
l=1 Jl(¯ p)}
at(¯ p) = θ(z) for all z ∈ Zt(¯ p), and
Jt(¯ p) = {j ∈ {1,...,n} | ¯ pAfj ∈ Zt(¯ p)}.
If Zt(¯ p) = ∅, then Jt(¯ p) = ∅ and we deﬁne at(¯ p) = (∞,...,∞). Similarly
one can deﬁne the vector bt(¯ q) ∈ Rs and the sets Zt(¯ q) and It(¯ q).
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Let ¯ p,p ∈
∆m. We say that ¯ p protectively dominates p, in notation, ¯ p ≻pro p, if there
exists an l ∈ N such that
(i) at(¯ p) = at(p) and Jt(¯ p) = Jt(p) for all t ∈ N,t < l, and
(ii) al(¯ p) ≻L al(p) or, both al(¯ p) = al(p) and Jl(¯ p)   Jl(p).
2Note that this vector is well-deﬁned since the lexicographic minimum within the or-
dered sets is unique.
11A mixed strategy p ∈ ∆m is called protective for player 1 in Γ if there does
not exist a mixed strategy ¯ p ∈ ∆m such that ¯ p ≻pro p. In a similar way one
can deﬁne protective strategies for player 2.
Even though the protective dominance relation need not to be complete,
the next lemma reveals that a protective strategy is dominant, up to payoﬀ
equivalence, with respect to the relation ≻pro. Here, two strategies are payoﬀ
equivalent if they yield the same payoﬀ with respect to all criteria and all
pure strategies of the other player. For this we ﬁrst need a technical lemma.
Lemma 4.1 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Consider
¯ p,p ∈ ∆m and deﬁne ˆ p = α¯ p + (1 − α)p for some α ∈ (0,1). Moreover, let
j ∈ {1,...,n} be such that ¯ pAfj  = pAfj. Then either θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(¯ pAfj)
or θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(pAfj).
Proof: Let d ∈ {1,...,r}. Then (ˆ pAfj)d = α(¯ pAfj)d + (1 − α)(pAfj)d and
hence,
(ˆ pAfj)d = (¯ pAfj)d = (pAfj)d if (¯ pAfj)d = (pAfj)d, (1)
(ˆ pAfj)d > min{(¯ pAfj)d,(pAfj)d} if (¯ pAfj)d  = (pAfj)d. (2)
Let ¯ σ be an ordering of the criteria such that (¯ pAfj)¯ σ(u) = (θ(¯ pAfj))u for
all u ∈ {1,...,r} and ¯ σ(u) < ¯ σ(v) whenever (θ(¯ pAfj))u = (θ(¯ pAfj))v and
u < v. In a similar way one can deﬁne σ which gives an ordering of the
criteria based on θ(pAfj).
If ¯ σ and σ are equal, then θ(ˆ pAfj) = αθ(¯ pAfj) + (1 − α)θ(pAfj). Since
¯ pAfj  = pAfj, we can assume without loss of generality that θ(¯ pAfj)) ≻L
θ(pAfj). Deﬁne v as the smallest number such that (θ(¯ pAfj))v  = (θ(pAfj))v.
Then equation (1) is valid for all criteria σ(l) with l < v. Inequality (2) is
true for d = σ(v), implying that (ˆ pAfj)σ(v) > (pAfj)σ(v). For all l > v:
(¯ pAfj)σ(l) ≥ (¯ pAfj)σ(v) > (pAfj)σ(v), together with (pAfj)σ(l) ≥ (pAfj)σ(v),
this indicates that (ˆ pAfj)σ(l) > (pAfj)σ(v) . It can be concluded that
θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(pAfj).
Assume that ¯ σ and σ are not equal. Let u be the smallest number such that
¯ σ(u)  = σ(u). There are two cases.
In the ﬁrst case (θ(¯ pAfj))l = (θ(pAfj))l for all l ∈ {1,l...,u} and hence
equation (1) is valid for all l ∈ {1,...,u − 1}, implying that
(ˆ pAfj)σ(l) = (¯ pAfj)σ(l) = (pAfj)σ(l) (3)
12for all l ∈ {1,...,u − 1}. Without loss of generality we assume that σ(u) <
¯ σ(u). It follows from the deﬁnition of σ and ¯ σ that (¯ pAfj)σ(u) > (pAfj)σ(u).
Using inequality (2) we ﬁnd
(ˆ pAfj)σ(u) > (pAfj)σ(u). (4)
For all l > u it is true that (¯ pAfj)σ(l) ≥ (θ(¯ pAfj))u = (θ(pAfj))u and
(pAfj)σ(l) ≥ (θ(pAfj))u. Hence,
(ˆ pAfj)σ(l) ≥ (θ(pAfj))u, (5)
and equality holds if and only if (¯ pAfj)σ(l) = (θ(pAfj))u = (pAfj)σ(l). We
conclude from (3), (4) and (5) that
θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(pAfj).
In the second case there exists an l ≤ u such that (θ(¯ pAfj))l  = θ(pAfj))l.
Let v be the smallest number such that (θ(¯ pAfj))v  = θ(pAfj))v. Assume
without loss of generality that θ(¯ pAfj) ≻L θ(pAfj). Then for all l < v:
(¯ pAfj)σ(l) = (pAfj)σ(l) and hence equation (1) is true with d = σ(l). For
all l ≥ v: (¯ pAfj)σ(l) ≥ (θ(¯ pAfj))v > (θ(pAfj))v = (pAfj)σ(v). Hence, by
inequality (2),
(θ(ˆ pAfj))σ(l) > min{(¯ pAfj)σ(l),(pAfj)σ(l)} > (θ(pAfj))v.
It follows that θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(pAfj). ￿
Lemma 4.2 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Let ¯ p be a
protective strategy for player 1 and let p ∈ ∆m. Then, either ¯ p and p are
payoﬀ equivalent for player 1 or ¯ p ≻pro p.
Proof: Suppose that ¯ p and p are not payoﬀ equivalent and that ¯ p does
not protectively dominate p. Let α ∈ (0,1) and deﬁne ˆ p := α¯ p + (1 − α)p.
It is shown below that the strategy ˆ p protectively dominates ¯ p, yielding a
contradiction.
Because of our assumptions, there exists an l ∈ N such that
at(¯ p) = at(p) and Jt(¯ p) = Jt(p) for all t ∈ N,t < l, and (6)
al(¯ p) = al(p),Jl(¯ p) \ Jl(p)  = ∅ and Jl(p) \ Jl(¯ p)  = ∅. (7)
We ﬁrst prove that for all j ∈ Jt(¯ p), with t < l it holds that ¯ pAfj = pAfj
and hence ¯ pAfj = pAfj = ˆ pAfj. Suppose not: pick the smallest t < l
13for which we can ﬁnd j ∈ Jt(¯ p) = Jt(p) such that ¯ pAfj  = pAfj. Since
j ∈ Jt(p) = Jt(¯ p), it holds that θ(pAfj) = θ(¯ pAfj). It follows from Lemma
4.1 that θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(¯ pAfj) = θ(pAfj). Let k ∈ {1,...,n}\ ∪t
ℓ=1 Jℓ(¯ p).
Then θ(¯ pAfk) ≻L at(¯ p), and θ(pAfk) ≻L at(p) = at(¯ p). Using Lemma
4.1 yields: θ(ˆ pAfk) ≻L at(¯ p). Clearly for all u < t: au(ˆ p) = au(¯ p), and
Ju(ˆ p) = Ju(¯ p) = Ju(p), furthermore at(ˆ p) ≻L at(¯ p) or at(ˆ p) = at(¯ p) and
Jt(ˆ p) ⊂ Jt(¯ p) (since j ∈ Jt(¯ p), but j  ∈ Jt(ˆ p)). We can conclude that
ˆ p ≻prot ¯ p, yielding a contradiction.
Secondly, it can be proved in the same way as above that for all j ∈
Jl (¯ p) ∩ Jl (p) it is true that ¯ pAfj = pAfj.
There are now two cases: Jl(¯ p) ∩ Jl(p) = ∅ and Jl(¯ p) ∩ Jl(p)  = ∅.
Assume ﬁrst that Jl(¯ p) ∩ Jl(p) = ∅. Take j ∈ Jl(¯ p), then there is an u > l
such that j ∈ Ju(p). Because of Lemma 4.1 θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L θ(¯ pAfj) = al(¯ p).
Let j ∈ Ju(¯ p), with u > l. Then θ(¯ pAfj) ≻L al(¯ p) and θ(pAfj)  L al(¯ p).
Applying Lemma 4.1 gives θ(ˆ pAfk) ≻L al(¯ p). We can conclude that
θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L al(¯ p) (8)
for all j ∈ {1,...,n}\ ∪l−1
k=1 Jk(p). Hence, al(ˆ p) ≻L al(¯ p) and ˆ p ≻prot ¯ p.
Now assume Jl(¯ p) ∩ Jl(p)  = ∅. Then there is also a level of ˆ p with
the same vector value, since for all j ∈ Jl(¯ p) ∩ Jl(p)  = ∅, it holds that
θ(ˆ pAfj) = θ(¯ pAfj) = θ(pAfj) = al(¯ p). As we have seen before it follows
from Lemma 4.1 that for all j  ∈ ∪l
t=1(Jt(¯ p) ∩ Jt(p)):
θ(ˆ pAfj) ≻L al(¯ p).
Hence al(ˆ p) = al(¯ p) and Jl(ˆ p)   Jl(¯ p). So ˆ p ≻prot ¯ p, establishing a contra-
diction. ￿
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Let p, ¯ p ∈
∆m. We say that ¯ p prudently dominates p, in notation, ¯ p ≻pru p, if there
exists an l ∈ N such that
(i) at
1(¯ p) = at
1(p) and
   Jt(¯ p)
    =
   Jt(p)
    for all t ∈ N,t < l, and
(ii) al
1(¯ p) ≻L al
1(σ) or both al
1(¯ σ) = al
1(σ) and
   Jl(¯ p)
    <
   Jl(p)
   .
A mixed strategy p ∈ ∆m is called prudent for player 1 in Γ if there does
not exist a mixed strategy ¯ p ∈ ∆m such that ¯ p ≻pru p.
Notice that any prudent strategy is also protective, since if a strategy is
protectively dominated, it is also prudently dominated by the same strategy.
The following lemma proves the converse with the use of Lemma 4.2.
14Lemma 4.3 In any multicriteria game, a mixed strategy for player 1 is
protective if and only if it is prudent.
Proof: Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. It remains to prove
that any protective strategy is also prudent. Let p ∈ ∆m be a protective
strategy and suppose p is not a prudent strategy. Then, by deﬁnition, there
exists a strategy ¯ p such that ¯ p ≻pru p. This means that p and ¯ p are not payoﬀ
equivalent. By Lemma 4.2, p ≻pro ¯ p, from which it follows that p ≻pru ¯ p.
This is a contradiction. ￿
The following theorem guarantees the existence of a prudent (protective)
strategy combination in any two person multicriteria game.
Theorem 4.1 Every multicriteria two-person game has at least one prudent
strategy combination.
Proof: It suﬃces to prove the existence of a prudent strategy for player 1.
Let Γ =  ∆m,∆n,A,B  be a multicriteria game. Deﬁne the sets
M1 =
 





p ∈ M1 | |J1(p)| ≤ |J1(¯ p)| for any ¯ p ∈ M1 
, and
for every t > 1,
Mt =
 




p ∈ Mt | |Jt(p)| ≤ |Jt(¯ p)| for any ¯ p ∈ Mt 
.
It follows from the continuity of the function θ and the compactness of
∆m that M1 and P1 are non-empty compact sets3. It follows by induction
that Mt  = ∅, Pt  = ∅ and compact for any t ∈ N. Moreover, for every
p, ¯ p ∈ Mt we have at
1 (p) = at
1 (¯ p) and for every p, ¯ p ∈ Pt it holds that
al(p) = al(¯ p) and |Jl(¯ p)| = |Jl(p)|, for all l ∈ {1,...,t}. Since player 2 has
ﬁnitely many pure strategies, there exists a s ∈ N such that for all p ∈ Ps:
∪s
l=1Jl(p) = {1,...,n} and |Js(p)| > 0. Note that for all l > s, Pl = Ps,
al(p) = (∞,...,∞) and Jl(p) = ∅ for all p ∈ Pl. By deﬁnition the set Ps is
precisely the set of prudent strategies for player 1. ￿
In the following two examples the notion of protective strategy combina-
tions is illustrated in a zero-sum like environment. In the ﬁrst example it is
3In fact P
1 is a ﬁnite union of ﬁnite intersections of inverse images of compact sets,
hence P
1 is compact itself.
15shown that in a game with a large set of equilibria protectiveness picks the
intuitively logic strategic combination. In the second example it is shown
that a protective strategy combination need not necessarily be a (Pareto)
equilibrium.
Example 4.1 Consider the two person multicriteria game (∆2,∆2,A,B),






The set of Pareto equilibria equals ∆2×∆2, so each strategy combination is
an equilibrium. Let ¯ p = (p,1−p), with p ∈ [0,1] be a strategy of player one.
Then θ(¯ pAf1) = θ(¯ pAf2) = (p,1 − p) if p ≤ 1
2 and θ(¯ pAf1) = θ(¯ pAf2) =
(1−p,p) if p ≥ 1











is the only protective strategy of player 2.













Clearly, the only protective strategy of player one is e1. the only protective
strategy of player two is f1. The unique protective strategy combination
(e1,f1) is not an equilibrium, since player one can deviate to e2, achieving
a higher payoﬀ in both criteria.
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